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NOTE
A VICTORY IN DEFEAT:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUMSFELD V. FAIR ON
"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Jill Shotzberger
I. Introduction
On March 6, 2006, the United States Supreme Court
decided Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights.' In this decision, drafted by Chief Justice John
Roberts, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Con-
gress (1) requiring universities to provide military recrui-
ters with the same access to law school career services
offices that the school would grant to other prospective
employers and (2) withholding federal funding for the en-
tire university if the law school failed to grant this access.
2
The Supreme Court held that these requirements did not
violate the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of association.3 Although this case, which
pitted thirty-six prestigious law schools against the Secre-
tary of Defense, failed in its constitutional challenge, it
succeeded in bringing attention to a larger public policy
concern: the United States government's continued im-
plementation of the controversial policy of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell."
1 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., No. 04-1152,
slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter FAIR].2 Id. at 6.
3 Id. at 20.
1
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II. The Solomon Amendment
In 1993, Congress enacted "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
(DADT), a policy that banned openly gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals from serving in the military.4 This provision
codified a fifty-year-old practice that allowed any statement
by a soldier about his or her sexual orientation to anyone at
any time to be reasonable grounds for dismissal from ser-
vice. 5 Due to the implementation of the DADT policy, law
schools began to marginalize or even disallow military
recruiters on campus. 6 The Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) requires its member schools to adopt a
nondiscrimination policy that includes sexual orientation.
This policy limits the availability of a school's facilities
and resources to those employers that comply with the
AALS statement on equal opportunity employment. 7 Due
to DADT, military recruiters were unable to meet the re-
quirements of AALS's nondiscrimination policy, and they
were denied access or were granted limited recruiting
access by AALS schools.
8
In response to the restricted access for military re-
cruiters, Congress adopted the Solomon Amendment in
1996 as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act. 9
4 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1993).
5 E.g. NALP, Solomon Amendment Information,
www.nalp.org/content/index.php?pid=8 1&printer-friendly-true (last
visited June 4, 2006) [hereinafter NALP].
6
id.
7 E.g. Memorandum from Carl Monk, Association of American Law
Schools, Executive Committee Policy Regarding "Solomon Amend-
ment" (Jan. 24, 2000), www.aals.org/deansmemos/00-2.html (last
visited June 6, 2006).
8 See Remarks at the Georgetown Federalist Society Symposium:
Solomon Amendment: Can Congress Condition Benefits to Colleges
and Universities on Their Willingness to Allow Military Recruiters on
Campus 9 (Oct. 20, 2005) (transcript available at Georgetown Law
Center) [hereinafter Georgetown Symposium].
9 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (1999).
2
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This amendment prohibited the allocation of funds from the
Department of Defense to colleges or universities that
barred ROTC and military recruiters from access to campus
or career services. 10 In 1999, the Solomon Amendment
was modified in the Omnibus Appropriations Act to with-
hold funds from the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health
and Human Services, and Education.ll When the Solomon
Amendment was enacted, if a department of a university
(i.e. the law school) denied access to a military recruiter,
federal funding would be terminated for that department.
The 1999 modification expanded these sanctions by permit-
ting all federal funding to an entire university to be with-
drawn if military recruiters were denied access to a single
department within the institution.12 Congress approved a
final expansion of the Solomon Amendment in 2004 to
clarify and strengthen the policy by stating that military
recruiters must have the same access as other employers
and by increasing the potential penalty for noncompliance
by adding to the list of federal agencies that could deny
funding to the offending schools. 13
Il. Rumsfeld v. FAIR
After the 2004 revision of the Solomon Amend-
ment, thirty-six law schools, along with other affiliated
groups and individual plaintiffs, united to challenge the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment through a
new organization entitled the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights (FAIR). 14 FAIR asserted that the So-
lo Id.
I See NALP, supra note 5.
12 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (2006).
13id.
14 Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 10-11; see Brief for the
ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Rumsfeld
v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Brief of
ACL U].
3
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 134
lomon Amendment violated the First Amendment rights of
free expressive association and free speech through com-
pelled speech and viewpoint discrimination. 
15
The U.S. District Court in New Jersey held that
there was no violation of free speech, because the law
schools had adequate opportunity to express their own
opposition to the military policy of DADT while still pro-
tecting the government's interest in allowing military re-
cruiters on campus.16 Additionally, the court determined
that requiring military recruiters on campus comported with
the standard set in United States v. O'Brien. 7  0 'Brien
determined that a compelling government interest in main-
taining the availability of draft cards outweighs one's right
to noncommunicative conduct.18 With regard to the Solo-
mon Amendment, this precedent allows the government
"[to] regulate conduct even if such regulation entails an
incidental limitation on speech." 19 Furthermore, the district
court held that the expressive conduct of allowing military
recruiters on campus was merely secondary to the primary
economic purpose of supporting the armed forces. 20 Ac-
cording to the district court, the compelling government
interest in raising an army balanced against the law
schools' ability to reject the recruiters, albeit at the cost of
losing their funding, failed to infringe on the constitutional
rights of free speech and free association. 21
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disa-
greed, determining that it was unconstitutional to force a
law school to choose between First Amendment rights and
15 Brief ofACLU, supra note 14 at 5; FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 274-75 (D.N.J. 2003).
16See FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 3.
17 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 296 at 314.
18 See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-382 (1968) (holding that
burning a draft card is noncormmnicative conduct).
'9 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375).
20 Id. at 308.
21Id at 312.
4
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funding under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 2 2
The Court also held that the O'Brien analysis did not apply
because the Solomon Amendment explicitly restricted
expressive conduct, making the amendment unconstitution-
al on alternate grounds. 23  The Court reversed and re-
manded the decision to the lower court to issue a
preliminary injunction against application of the Solomon
Amendment.24 The Supreme Court granted Certiorari.25
IV. Statutory v. Constitutional Argument
The first struggle that came to fruition for FAIR and
the parties who opposed the Solomon Amendment con-
cerned their methodology in approaching the Court. Har-
vard Law professors, along with many of their colleagues,
filed amicus briefs arguing for a statutory, rather than a
constitutional, approach to eliminating the Solomon
Amendment. This challenged the language in the statute
which indicated that recruiters be granted access "at least
equal in quality and scope to the access. .. that is provided
to any other employer." 26 Under this language, the profes-
sors argued that AALS members and other schools that
prohibit military recruiters are doing so in compliance with
the Solomon Amendment, because they are treating the
military the same way that they would treat other employ-
ers who failed to adhere to the non-discrimination policy. 27
Thus, the schools would not be specifically targeting the
military, but rather, all parties who discriminate. This ar-
" FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3rd Cir. 2004).231 d. at 243-44.
Id. at 246.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005).
26 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(B)(1) (2006).
27 Daniel J. Hemel, Future of Campus Military Recruiting Hangs in the
Balance at High Court, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, Dec. 4, 2005,
www.thecrimson.corn/article.aspx?ref-=510278 (last visited June 8,
2006).
5
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gument presents the premise that schools are complying
with the Solomon Amendment as written, but Congress is
still withholding funds until special, rather than equal,
treatment is given to military recruiters.
28
The law schools attempted to sidestep the constitutional
issue by presenting the argument that they could implement
their nondiscrimination policies while giving separate, yet
equal access to military recruiters. Had FAIR only taken a
statutory approach and won, it is conceivable that Congress
might have immediately amended the statute to provide for
special treatment of military recruiters, thereby re-
launching the issue into a constitutional debate.29
Although not included in FAIR's brief, the Court
did address this issue in its opinion. The Court determined
that the intent of Congress in enacting the Solomon
Amendment was not in the content of the Amendment, but
rather, the result.30 Therefore, because access is the in-
tended result, when other employers have greater access
than the military, the schools are in violation of the
amendment. The Supreme Court interpreted the statute to
imply that it is not sufficient to treat the military the same
way as other employers who violate the nondiscrimination
policy.31 The military must be granted the "same access as
those who comply with the policy" in order to act in accor-
dance with the intention of Congress.
32
V. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The next element of this debate addressed by the
Supreme Court was whether Congress placed an unconsti-
28 Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 45.
29 Hemel, supra note 27.
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tutional condition on its allocation of funding. 33 In Grove
City College v. Bell, the Court indicated that funding could
be conditioned because universities are not obligated to
accept that funding. 34 This is seen most often, as it was in
Grove City, in Title IX gender discrimination cases. De-
spite Congress' ability to condition funding, Speiser v.
Randall determined that it is unconstitutional for Congress
to condition funding unless Congress would be able to
directly mandate that action.35 In this case, if Congress had
the power to directly order that recruiters be permitted on
university campuses, then they could condition the funding.
This gives the Spending Clause of the Constitution, which
determines how Congress may allocate funds, equal
breadth with those powers that can be directly required by
Congress. United States v. American Library Associations
determined that funding cannot be limited if the burden
placed on the accepting group infringes on constitutional
rights. 36  FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment
placed an unjust burden on speech. The Court disagreed.
The Court determined that it would be constitution-
al for Congress to directly mandate that military recruiters
be allowed on campus. This mandate is permitted because
the government interest in supporting the military should be
given deference. 37 FAIR's First Amendment challenges are
outweighed by the compelling government interest in sus-
taining national defense. The Court has used and indicates
it will continue to use the argument of a compelling gov-
ernment interest in national defense in challenges against
33 See id. at 9; see generally Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984).
4 See, e.g., Grove City College, 465 U.S. 555 at 575-76.
35 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); see also George-
town Symposium, supra note 8 at 25-26.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210
(2003).
31 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006).
7
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the military under Title IX or Title VI. 38 By asserting this
position, the Court shows its commitment to uphold and
give deference to military policies despite the possible
discriminatory effect on gender, race, or sexuality.
39
Therefore, it is inconsequential whether the condition is
attached to funding, because the Court validates the condi-
tion as a compelling government interest. 40 If a condition
can be directly mandated, then it can be attached to funding
through the Spending Clause.4'
VI. Speech
The next constitutional question addressed by the
Court was whether the Solomon Amendment violates the
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district
court determined that "the inclusion of an unwanted period-
ic visitor did not significantly affect the law schools' ability
to express their particular message or viewpoint. '42 The
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that speech was in-
volved in promoting the recruiters and that this speech
forced colleges to host the military's message, as well as
compelled the schools to sponsor the recruiters through
their resources. 43 The Supreme Court rejected this position.
According to the Court's decision in Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Assn., citizens may challenge compelled private
speech but have no First Amendment right not to fund
government speech.44  Therefore, there is "no First
Amendment right not to fund government speech as the
representatives of the United States military. ' ' 4  Any
38 id.
39 See Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 27.
40 See id. at 26.
41 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 3.
42 id.
431d. at 10.
44 Johanns. v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
45 id.
8
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speech expounded by the recruiters is considered govern-
ment speech. In addition, the Supreme Court held that the
assistance provided to the military recruiters was minimal
and not of a monetary nature; therefore, the subsidy issue
was not pertinent to the outcome of this case. 46
The next speech issue under consideration by the
Court was compelled government speech. The Court held
that cases such as West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard do not govern Rumsfeld
because, despite the fact that there are elements of speech
in disseminating notice of the recruiters' presence on cam-
pus, the speech used to comply with the Solomon Amend-
ment does not include a required government pledge or
specific content that the school must endorse. 47 Requiring
schools to include recruiters on event schedules or em-
ployment fair flyers does not approach the type of speech
protected by Wooley or Barnette.
Like compelled speech, the type of speech required
by the Solomon Amendment fails to meet the standard set
forth in cases dealing with hosting or accommodating
another group's message. To meet the burden of these
cases, the Solomon Amendment would have to inhibit the
school's own message and force the college or university to
accommodate the military's message instead of their own,
or the conduct would have to be of such an expressive
nature that the message of the school would be compro-
mised by the inclusion of the recruiters. 48 The Court held
46FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 11 n.4.47 Id. at 11-12. See generally W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (holding that a state law requiring school children to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag was unconstitutional); see
generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding it was
unconstitutional for New Hampshire to require that drivers display
"Live Free or Die" on their license plate).
48 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15. See generally Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that the public accommodation law as applied to a private
9
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that allowing recruiters on campus is not inherently expres-
sive, because assisting a student in obtaining employment
is not expressive. 49 Furthermore, the message of the school
is not suppressed through this statute. Colleges and univer-
sities are free to voice their opposition to DADT or any
other military policy. The colleges may post signs where
the recruiters are located or speak out on the issue without
ramifications under the Solomon Amendment. The Court
rejected the argument that simply by having the recruiters
on campus, the school would be viewed as endorsing the
military's policies. 50 As the Court decided in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
high school students are capable of distinguishing between
speech that a school sponsors and speech that a school
permits; Chief Justice Roberts contended, "Surely students
have not lost that ability by the time they get to law
school. ' 51 Since colleges and universities are still free to
express their views on military policies and the message of
the school is in no way compromised by the Solomon
Amendment, the Court determined that there is no in-
fringement on speech.
VII. Expressive Conduct
Conduct can be recognized as symbolic speech
when its inherently expressive nature merits First Amend-
ment protection.5 2 The Court determined that the conduct
governed by the Solomon Amendment is not inherently
parade can alter the expressive nature of the conduct and violates the
First Amendment protection of choosing one's own message); see
generally Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(holding that you cannot interfere with a speaker's intended message).
41 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15.
50 d. at 10.
51 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
52 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
10
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expressive. 53 Since the message that universities are send-
ing when they exclude military recruiters is unclear without
the accompanying speech, the conduct alone is not expres-
sive.54 The Court held that since explanatory speech is
needed to accompany the conduct, O 'Brien does not govern
the issue.55 Moreover, a minor burden on speech is per-
missible under O'Brien if the government regulation at
issue promotes a substantial government interest that would
be more difficult to attain without the existing 
policy. 56
Raising and supporting a military is a substantial govern-
ment interest, and the effectiveness of this action is altered
when schools hinder the military's ability to recruit. Al-
though alternative methods for recruiting can be imple-
mented, the Supreme Court has deemed this the
responsibility of Congress rather than of the courts.5
7 Since
the Solomon Amendment does assist in the effectiveness of
military recruiting and is the chosen method of Congress,
the policy will withstand the challenge under O'Brien and
does not constitute a violation of the First Amendment right
to freedom of speech.58
VIII. Freedom of Association
The First Amendment goes beyond the right of
speech, in that it also protects the freedom of association.
One important recent case on the freedom of expressive
association is Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.59 In Dale, the




57 Id. at 18.
58 d.
59 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-59 (2000)
(holding that the Boy Scouts were an expressive association in which
the forced inclusion of a homosexual would significantly affect their
11
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government of New Jersey was forcing the organization to
"accept members it did not desire." 60 Unlike Dale, under
the Solomon Amendment, schools are not compelled to
associate with military recruiters in this fashion; the schools
are simply required to interact with the recruiters for a
limited time and purpose, which fails to inhibit the school's
message. 61 There is neither forced inclusion nor an effect
on the schools' right to expressive association, because
they are still free to convey their disapproval of the mili-
tary's message. Likewise, according to the Court, there is
no effect on the attractiveness of membership in the univer-
sity simply because of the presence of military recruiters. 
62
Through this analysis, the Court held that there was
no infringement on the First Amendment protections of
freedom of speech, expressive conduct, or association.
There was also no violation of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions. Therefore, the Solomon Amendment is
constitutional and should continue to be upheld.
IX. Why FAIR Lost the Battle
FAIR and numerous other organizations and legal
scholars disagree with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rumsfeld. The first point of contention is how the Court
treated speech. For FAIR, et al. the definition of speech
may have been more narrowly construed than was ex-
pected. Email and written notices, as well as providing the
recruiters with space and access to students, were actions
too broad to be considered as speech by the Court. Re-
nowned constitutional scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, who
personally filed his own amicus brief, wrote, "Never before
expression. The states interest did not justify the intrusion; therefore, it
violated the organization's First Amendment rights).
"°FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op at 19.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 20.
12
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has the Supreme Court held that the government can com-
pel speech as long as the speaker can disavow the com-
pelled message later." 63 He cited Hurley v. Irish- American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. as illu-
strating that compelled speech was not excused only be-
cause the parade organizers could have expressed their
disapproval of the group. 64 By limiting what is considered
protected speech, the Court diminished the effectiveness of
the FAIR supporters' contentions.
Not only was the argument about the form of
speech curtailed, but other scholars contend that the Court
undervalued the significance of the non-discrimination
message. Non-discrimination, to the extent it is valued by
these universities, is a momentous expression. By denying
recognition of this policy as speech, the Court not only
affected challenges to the Solomon Amendment but many
fear their decision spoke to the new Roberts Court's ap-
proach to equality and discrimination issues.
65
In addition to altering what was previously ac-
knowledged as speech, this Court also took a new approach
to the nature of freedom of association. For the first time,
freedom of association was limited to those groups with
membership. 66 The Court had previously ruled, "the gov-
ernment cannot compel association in a manner that is
inconsistent with a group's expressive message. 67 Appli-
cation of the Solomon Amendment to universities forces
association by compelling interaction with military recrui-
ters. It may have been unforeseen by FAIR and its suppor-
ters that "interaction" would be construed differently than
63 Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and Military Recruiting,
TRIAL, May 2006, at 79.
64 Id.
65 See David L. Hudson, Law Schools Told to Allow Military Recrui-
ters, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT, Mar. 10, 2006.66Chemerinsky, supra note 63.
67 I.; see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
13
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"association' thereby negating their freedom of association
claims.
A final misjudgment by FAIR may have been their
choice of challenging the Solomon Amendment, rather than
going to the root of the problem. DADT is bad public
policy and is the origin of the challenges to the Solomon
Amendment. Although DADT conflicts with the schools'
non-discrimination policies, many scholars, even those who
vehemently oppose DADT, thought the First Amendment
contentions against the Solomon Amendment were obscure
at best. With a growing trend on the Court towards strict
textualism, supporters acknowledged that it would be diffi-
cult to mold the law schools' concerns into a First Amend-
ment case. 68 On the surface, the statutory challenges were
more substantiated than the constitutional claims, despite
their easy correction by Congress through a minor change
in the language. However, the Court struck these chal-
lenges down as well. Notwithstanding, their overwhelming
defeat in this case, FAIR and their supporters still have
other fronts on which they can voice their opposition to the
Solomon Amendment and DADT.
X. Why Rumsfeld v. FAIR May Be a Turning Point
in a Greater War
The Solomon Amendment is only a symptom of a
greater quandary. If DADT were repealed, law schools
would not need to exclude the military, because there
would be no conflict with the Solomon Amendment.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR could act as a symbolic expression of a
growing majority who oppose the military's discriminatory
policies. Bringing attention to challenges like Rumsfeld
promotes messages of equality and the repeal of DADT.
69
68 Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8.
69 See SolomonResponse.org Home Page, www.SolomonResponse.org
(last visited June 10, 2006).
14
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In upholding the Solomon Amendment, the Court endorses
a policy that forces schools to relent on their messages of
non-discrimination. The outcome of Rumsfeld has inspired
others to further scrutinize DADT, the policy on which the
decision was grounded. 70 Even with unanimous defeat in
Rumsfeld, DADT and the Solomon Amendment have been
thrust into the public forum bringing attention to what
many Americans would consider unfair and discriminatory
policies. Once the issue reaches the forefront, new meas-
ures can be advanced and considered in defining a viable
strategy to overturn these policies.
Given that the Solomon Amendment and DADT are
statutory, there are two methods to defeat them. The first is
for the courts to deem them unconstitutional. The second is
for Congress to repeal them. 71 Currently, two challenges to
DADT await litigation that could eliminate the policy.
72
Chemerinsky contends that Rumsfeld may have only a
narrow impact as precedent or as a guide to policy because
the longstanding tradition of deference to the military by
the Supreme Court. This continuing deference, coupled
with decisions like Dale and Hurley, which are discrimina-
tory to the gay and lesbian community, may limit the
Court's application of this case as future precedent. 
73
The second means of eliminating DADT, through
Congressional repeal, is also gaining momentum. As more
attention is brought to the millions of dollars spent to oust
more than 10,000 homosexuals from the military, some
members of Congress are taking action.74 Representative
70 Posting of Sharon Alexander, Deputy Director of Policy, Service-
members Legal Defense Network, to American Constitution Society
Blog, www.acsblog.org/guest-bloggers-2672-guest-blogger-losing-the-
battle-but-winning-the-war.html (Mar. 9, 2006, 2:15 PM EST) [herei-
nafter Alexander].71id.
72 id.
73 Chemerinsky, supra note 63.
74 Alexander, supra note 70.
15
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Marty Meehan of Massachusetts introduced the Military
Readiness Enhancement Act, which would repeal DADT.75
The bill, which currently has 114 co-sponsors in the House,
is awaiting further discussion in the Military Personnel
76Subcommittee. Interested parties are also working on
finding bipartisan co-sponsors in the Senate to introduce
similar legislation. 77 As support grows in Congress, in-
creased attention will be brought to the dangers of discri-
minatory policies and their effects outside the military in
places like universities.
XI. Conclusion
Through the above-mentioned legislative and legal
methods, the cause championed by FAIR and its supporters
has not been lost; continued challenges to DADT are un-
derway. As the attack on discriminatory public policies
continues on multiple fronts, Rumsfeld v. FAIR may prove
not to be a setback, but a stepping stone to the abolition of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
75 See Press Release, Representative Marty Meehan, Meehan Introduc-
es Legislation to Repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell (Mar. 2, 2005),
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ma5_meehan/NR050302DADT.html
(last visited June 8, 2006).76 See HR 1059, 109th Cong. (2005).
77Alexander, supra note 70.
16
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